A short proof of Reny (1999)'s equilibrium existence theorem for payo¤ secure games is provided. At the heart of the proof lies the concept of a multivalued mapping with the local intersection property. By means of the Fan-Browder collective …xed-point theorem, we show an approximate equilibrium existence theorem which covers a number of known games. Reny's theorem follows from it straightforwardly.
Introduction
Reny (1999)'s theorem states that any game with compact, convex strategy spaces and payo¤s at least quasiconcave in each player's strategy has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if, in addition, the game is better-reply secure. The number of applications of this important result has been steadily growing. So, it has been applied to the problem of mixed strategy equilibrium existence in a nonlinear pricing game by Page and Monteiro (2003) and in a voting game by Carbonell-Nicolau and Ok (2007) . Monteiro and Page (2007) provide su¢ cient conditions for mixed extensions of discontinuous games to be payo¤ secure.
The focus of this paper is on payo¤ secure games. We …rst look in detail at the notion of payo¤ security. Under the payo¤ security condition, we associate with each player's payo¤ function a multivalued mapping that has the local intersection property, which was introduced by Wu and Shen (1996) . Then we invoke a generalized version of the Fan-Browder collective …xed-point theorem to show an approximate equilibrium existence theorem (Theorem 2).
Theorem 2 states that every compact, quasiconcave, and payo¤ secure game has a pure strategy " Nash equilibrium for every " > 0, if, in addition, the players' value functions are continuous. These conditions hold in many economic applications, including …rst-price sealed-bid auctions with complete information and Bertrand's oligopoly games with di¤erent unit costs. It is worth noting that if, in addition to these conditions, limit points of each player's approximate best replies, with the level of approximation converging to zero, are themselves best replies, then the existence of pure strategy Nash equilbria follows (Carmona 2008) .
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In order to obtain Reny's theorem for payo¤ secure games, we approximate from below each player's lower semicontinuous value function (which is the case under payo¤ security) by an increasing sequence of continuous functions and then invoke Theorem 2.
The next section contains all necessary de…nitions.
The Model and Some De…nitions
We consider a game G between n players where each player i 0 s pure strategy set X i is a nonempty compact subset of a Hausdor¤ topological vector space, and each player i 0 s payo¤ function u i is a bounded function from X = i2N X i to R (X being endowed with the product topology). Under these conditions, G = (
is called a compact game. Denote the set of players by N = f1; : : : ; ng. A game
quasiconcave for all i 2 N and all x i 2 X i ; where
closure of (G) in X R n and Fr (G) = cl (G)n (G) the frontier of (G); which is the set of points that are in cl (G) but not in (G):
The cornerstone of Reny (1999) 's existence results is the notion of better-reply security.
is better-reply secure if whenever (x ; u ) 2 cl (G) and x is not an equilibrium, some player i can secure a payo¤ strictly above
4 Now, we state Reny (1999)'s existence theorem.
Theorem 1 (Reny 1999 
is compact, quasiconcave, and betterreply secure, then it possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
The notion of payo¤ security, introduced in Reny (1999) , is important for applications since many games of economic interest are payo¤ secure.
is payo¤ secure if for every x 2 X and every
A notion equivalent to payo¤ security was introduced independently by Tian (1992).
De…nition 4 Let Z and Y be subsets of some topological spaces. A function f :
f (z; y) > implies that there exists some point z 0 2 Z and some neighborhood N (y)
lower semicontinuous in y if f is transfer lower semicontinuous in y for every
The equivalence of these two notions obtains if, in De…nition 4, we put f = u i ;
Example 1 in Carmona (2005) shows that a compact, quasiconcave, and payo¤ secure game need not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. A conventional way to ensure the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in such games is to add a condition related to but weaker than the upper semicontinuity of the players'payo¤ functions. Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) 's condition that the sum of the players' payo¤ functions be upper semicontinuous is often employed. This condition has gone through a number of generalizations: reciprocal upper semicontinuity (known also as complimentary discontinuity) by Simon (1987) and then weak reciprocal upper semicontinuity by Bagh and Jofre (2006) .
is weakly reciprocal upper semicontinuous, if for any (x; ) 2 Fr ; there is a player i and b
Payo¤ security and weak reciprocal upper semicontinuity together imply betterreply security. Under payo¤ security better-reply security is tantamount to weak reciprocal upper semicontinuity.
We will also need some de…nitions from multivalued analysis. Let Y and Z denote subsets of some topological spaces. The domain, DomF , of a multivalued mapping
The concept of a mulivalued mapping with the local intersection property plays a central role for payo¤ secure games.
De…nition 6 A mapping F : Y Z has the local intersection property if for each y 2 DomF; there exists an open neighborhood N (y) of y such that \ w2N (y) F (w) 6 = ?:
An important observation is that if f : Z Y 7 ! R is transfer lower semicontinuous in y; then the mapping F : Y Z de…ned by
where 2 R; has the local intersection property. For the reader's convenience, we provide a short proof of Lemma 1 in the Appendix.
Payo¤ Security and Epsilon Equilibria
In this section we consider conditions which yield pure strategy epsilon equilibria.
Theorem 2 was …rst formulated and proved in an unpublished section of Reny (1996) 1 .
However its proof (Reny 1996, p. 16 ) repeats most of the proof of Reny's main equilibrium existence theorem. Our proof, in its turn, is based on invoking the FanBrowder …xed-point theorem (Theorem 3).
For the sake of completeness, let us remind the de…nition of a pure strategy " Nash equilibrium. A strategy pro…le x 2 i2N X i is a pure strategy "-Nash equi-
It is easy to see that the payo¤ security of G implies the lower semicontinuity of each player i's value function g i : X i 7 ! R de…ned by
1 I thank Phil Reny for pointing out this fact to me.
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A stronger property often holds, namely, players' value functions are continuous in many games. Examples of such games are …rst-price sealed-bid auctions with complete information and Bertrand oligopoly games with di¤erent unit costs. These games might not possess a pure strategy Nash equilibrium but, by Theorem 2, they always have a pure strategy " Nash equilibrium for every " > 0 because, in addition, they are quasiconcave.
is a compact, quasiconcave, and payo¤ secure game.
If, in addition, each player i's value function g i is continuous, then G possesses a pure strategy "-Nash equilibrium for every " > 0.
The proof of Theorem 2 is based on invoking the Fan-Browder theorem, which Fan (1966) and Browder (1968) used to show the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in every compact, quasiconcave, and continuous game. Corollary 1 Let X 1 ; : : : ; X n (n 2) be nonempty, compact, convex sets, each in a
Hausdor¤ topological vector space. Let M i : X i X i be a mapping with nonempty, convex values and having the local intersection property for each i 2 N . Then there
The proof of Corollary 1 is given in the Appendix. Some other formulations and proofs of Corollary 1 can be found in Wu and Shen (1996, Theorem 2) and Lan and Wu (2002, Theorem 3.1) . Now, we are in the position to prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Fix " > 0: For each i 2 N; consider the mapping M " i :
It is clear that M " i is nonempty-valued. Since g i is continuous on X i ; it is easy to see 4 Proof of Reny' s Theorem for Payo¤Secure Games
In this section we prove Theorem 1 for payo¤ secure games under the assumption that each X i is a nonempty compact subset of a metric vector space. It is useful to note that every metric space is a Hausdor¤ topological space whose topology is generated by the metric.
Since better reply security is equivalent to weak reciprocal upper semicontinuity under payo¤ security, Theorem 1 can be reformulated as follows.
is a compact, quasiconcave, payo¤ secure, and weakly reciprocal upper semicontinuous game, then G possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
On metric spaces, bounded below, lower semicontinuous functions are pointwise limits of increasing sequences of continuous functions (see, for example, Aliprantis and Border 2006, Theorem 3.13 ). This observation serves as a bridge from Theorem 2 to Theorem 4. The next lemma shows that any increasing sequence of continuous functions that converges pointwise to a lower semicontinuous function approximates the function "highly enough" for our purposes (see also Reny 1999, Lemma 3.5) .
Lemma 2 Let Z be a metric space and let f : Z 7 ! R be a bounded below, lower semicontinuous, and ff k g; f k : Z 7 ! R; be an increasing sequence of continuous
all z 2 Z and all sequences fz k g in Z converging to z:
The proof of Lemma 2 is given in the Appendix. Now, we proceed to the proof of Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4. The payo¤ security of G implies that each player i's value function g i is lower semicontinuous. Moreover, each g i is bounded since the game G is compact. Then there exists an increasing sequence of continuous functions fg
Let " k be a sequence of positive numbers such that " k # 0: For each i 2 N and each k 2 f1; 2; : : :g, consider the mapping
It is clear that each M 
Since X is compact, we can assume that the sequence fx k g converges to some x 2 X:
We claim that x is a Nash equilibrium of G. Assume, by contradiction, that there
by Lemma 2, there exists a subsequence fx k g of fx k g along which player i 0 's payo¤ jumps down at x. The weak reciprocal upper semicontinuity of G implies that some player i 00 can get a payo¤ strictly above
Proof of Corollary 1
Since each M i has the local intersection property and DomM i = X i , by Lemma 1, there exists F i : X i X i with open lower sections such that DomF i = X i and
for every x i 2 X i and each i 2 N: Then, by Lemma 5.1 of Yannelis and Prabhakar (1983) , the mapping G i : X i X i de…ned by G i (x i ) = coF i (x i ) also has open lower sections for each i 2 N (coA denotes the convex hull of A). By Theorem 3, there exists x 2 X such that x i 2 G i (x i ) for all i 2 N: Since each M i has convex values, G i (x i ) M i (x i ) for every x i 2 X i and each i 2 N:
Therefore, x i 2 M i (x i ) for all i 2 N:
Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exist z 0 2 Z and a sequence fz k g in Z converging to z 0 such that
is an increasing sequence, there exist integer m and a small enough " > 0 such that
The continuity of f m implies that there exists a neighborhood U of z 0 such that f m (z) > lim k f k (z k ) + " for all z 2 U: Since ff k g is an increasing sequence, f k (z) > lim k f k (z k ) + " for all z 2 U and all k m; a contradiction.
